injured. This, of course, presupposes that the publication is admittedly wrongful or clearly shown to be so. For a discussion favoring the restraining of libel see 29 HARV. L. REV. 640.

MASTER AND SERVANT—ACCEPTANCE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AS TO FARM LABORER.—Defendant was a corporation manufacturing drugs, serums, etc., its chief office and factory being in Detroit. It maintains, however, a farm near Detroit, on which are kept many horses for serum production, which is the chief purpose of the farm. Some of the grain raised on the farm, however, is sold. Plaintiff was employed generally on the farm, and was injured while caring for the horses, and sues to recover against the defendant under the WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, (Act 10 of the Special Session of 1912). The defendant corporation had accepted the provisions of the act by a statement in general terms, neither expressly including nor excluding any particular class of employes. It had also posted notices of its acceptance in its laboratories, offices, etc., in Detroit, but not on the farm on which plaintiff was injured. *Held,* defendant is not liable under said act. *Shafer* v. *Parke Davis & Co.,* (Mich. 1916), 159 N. W. 304.

On the question of whether or not the plaintiff was within the class referred to by the statute as a farm laborer, it was the opinion of the Industrial Accident Board that the company should not be classed as a farmer, inasmuch as its use of the farm was but incidental to its principal occupation as a manufacturer, and that the claimant, consequently, was not a farm laborer. In reversing this, the supreme court said: "The statute does not classify the employee by the ordinary business of his employer, but by the kind of work he, himself, is employed to do. And any attempt to classify the employee through a consideration of the uses for which the product of the farm is designed would lead to endless confusion." On the question of whether or not the defendant had accepted the Act, the court held that although employers of farm laborers are exempt from the coercive effects of the Act, still they are not barred from electing to come under it (OSTRANDER, J., dissenting). But as they are exempt from the coercive effect, they can still retain their common law defenses in actions against them by farm laborers, and consequently the court held that it could not assume an acceptance, which would be a waiver of its common law defenses, unless the same appeared clearly and specifically—that the general acceptance, and the posting of notices in the offices in Detroit, was not sufficient from which to construe acceptance as to the farm outside. Therefore, not having accepted the Act as to the farm, the defendant is not liable to this plaintiff under the Act.

PARENT AND CHILD—LIABILITY OF PARENT FOR NECESSARIES.—The defendant had moved from Chattanooga into an adjoining county, leaving his two minor daughters to take care of themselves, which they did without assistance from him. The younger, a girl of seventeen years, became ill and the plaintiff, a physician, was called in. The defendant was informed by the older daughter that a slight operation was necessary and he assented. The plaintiff did not know of the defendant's assent until after the